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Abstract: 
 
The adoption process of the emission trading scheme (ETS) directive in the co-decision 
procedure merged the dynamics of problem solution and political gaming, which Kingdon 
calls policy and political streams. An application of Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework 
shows that an “economy-first” and an “environment-first” coalition competed for influence on 
the ETS. Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) as part of one advocacy coalition were subject to 
the constraints of lobbying in a multi-level governance system. Their ability to influence the 
ETS depended on relatively stable parameters and external events. As ENGOs are outsiders to 
the bodies with formal authority in the European Union (EU), they needed powerful coalition 
members such as DG Environment and the European Parliament (EP)  as well as strong 
external facilitating factors. ENGOs fared better in the policy stream than in the political 
stream. They aimed for a strong initial Commission proposal to set a path-dependent process 
in motion and at counterbalancing the Council with the EP. They can contribute to policy-
oriented learning and instrumentalise perturbations, but they are not able to create a 
negotiation stalemate. 
 
 
 
 
 
The paper is based on the Master’s thesis, The influence of environmental NGOs on the design 
of the emissions trading scheme of the EU. An Application of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, College of Europe, Department of European Political and Administrative Studies 
Bruges, 2007, available in the institution’s library. Please consult this document for an 
elaboration of the analysis below. 
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Pursuant to Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union, the parties of the Kyoto 
Protocol “may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their 
commitments under Article 3”.
1 In the years preceding the adoption of the emission trading 
scheme (ETS), the term ‘climate policy’ had been associated with political failure.
2
Emission trading is based on tradeable permits which are granted to polluters. If the 
permits are limited to a quantity smaller than the gas normally expected to be emitted, the 
environmental outcome can be controlled ex ante. Polluters have the choice to reduce their 
emissions or to buy the amount of permits they additionally need from other participants on 
the market. The European ETS in particular is a company-based scheme. The final ETS-
Directive covered 4,000-5,000 industrial installations with high energy intensity. 38 per cent 
of the greenhouse gases defined in Kyoto are covered by the directive.
 The ETS 
was seen as a way out as it innovatively combines environmental protection with an economic 
approach. Additionally, the establishment of an emission trading market extends the 
traditional focus of the EU on markets to environmental protection.  
3 The ETS has the 
potential to reduce the implementation costs of the Kyoto-Protocol by 1.7 billion euros a year
4
                                                 
1   United Nations (1998): “Kyoto-Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” 
(New York): Article 17 
2   Rabe, Barry (2007): “Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in Multilevel Governance Systems,” 
Governance, 20 (3): 423 
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Proposal for a CO2 Emissions Trading System in Europe,” European Environment 12: 186 
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because of its economic approach. 
Between 2005 and 2008, the first pilot phase of the ETS Directive was underway. 
Publications so far have mostly concentrated on either the international decision-making 
or the effectiveness of the new policy instrument, yet the EU decision-making itself is left 
under-researched. In particular, an academic account of the influence of environmental NGOs 
(ENGOs) is missing thus far.   4 
This paper aims to elaborate on the influence of ENGOs in a multi-level governance 
system under co-decision, given the multitude of actors, access points and dynamics. Three 
sub-questions structure the analysis of the case study: 1) Which factor constellations are 
required for a potentially successful interaction with the institutions? 2) Which type of 
strategy is successful facing a technocratic initiator of legislation (policy stream)? 3) Which 
type of strategy is successful facing political decision-making institutions (political stream
5
The analysis is structured by the advocacy coalition framework (ACF).
)? 
6
The author strived for a far-ranging usage of different sources to sufficiently grasp the 
complexities of the legislative process. In addition to the obligatory review of academic 
accounts of the topic at hand, this analysis particularly uses information extracted from 
position papers, legislative process documents and qualitative interviews. The author has been 
able to obtain time with representatives of the Council, the Commission, the science 
 Following the 
ACF, two advocacy coalitions can be identified: “environment-first” and “economy-first.” 
By identifying advocacy coalitions and assessing the exogenous and endogenous variables 
determining their influence in a process analytically distinguished by a policy and a political 
stream, some theoretical reflections will be made possible. 
It is expected that ENGOs, as outsiders to the EU as a multi-level governance system, 
have only limited power. They depend on an array of (external) factors beyond their 
influence, such as institutional constellations and the values of society. They need powerful 
coalition members in both the policy and the political stream. This study works with the 
assumption that ENGOs might have a better impact during the policy stream than during the 
political stream because of their emphasis on argumentative rationality. 
                                                 
5   Kingdon, John (2003): “Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies,” (New York: Longman) 
6   Sabatier, Paul and Christopher Weible (2007): “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and 
Clarifications,” in: Theories of the Policy Process edited by P. Sabatier (Colorado: Westview Press)   5 
community, as well as business and environmental interest groups. A representative of the 
European Parliament could, for procedural reasons, not be interviewed. 
 
1. Advocacy Coalitions within the EU 
1.1 The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The ACF developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
7 has undergone several revisions 
between 1988 and 2007 but has not yet reached the status of a full-fledged theory. Following 
the ACF in its 2007 version, the plurality of a system can, on a meso-level, best be captured 
by aggregating actors into advocacy coalitions. The formation of advocacy coalitions takes 
place on the basis of beliefs “in a nontrivial degree of coordination.”
8
On a micro-level, advocacy coalitions are formed on the basis of corresponding belief 
systems. The belief systems are categorized as three-tiered: deep core beliefs, policy core 
beliefs and secondary beliefs. Especially the first two are considered to be “the stickiest glue 
that binds coalitions together.”
 The actors engage in 
coalitions to realise shared policy objectives in a policy network structure. On a macro-level, 
the complexity of policy-making forces actors to specialise. They are affected by political and 
socioeconomic systemic factors in their respective policy subsystem.  
9 By operationalizing policy core beliefs linked to actors in the 
policy subsystem and grouping them accordingly, two to five advocacy coalitions are 
traditionally identified.
10  Major policy change, then, is caused by a change in the belief 
systems of the advocacy coalitions which is either endogenously or exogenously caused.
11
                                                 
7   Sabatier, Paul (1998): “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe,” Journal 
of European Public Policy 5(1): 98 
8   Sabatier, ACF Innovations, op.cit.: 196 
9   Sabatier, ACF Innovations, op.cit.: 195 
10   ibid.: 195 
11   Kübler, Daniel (2001): “Understanding Policy Change With the Advocacy Coalition Framework: An 
Application to Swiss Drug Policy,” Journal of European Public Policy 8(4): 624 
 
Sabatier has identified four paths to policy change: (1) Policy-oriented learning and (2) a   6 
hurting stalemate are variables which change the belief system, whereas (3) internal and (4) 
external shocks do not only cause this change but also redistribute resources.
 12
Policy-oriented learning and the hurting stalemate are strategies applied by the 
advocacy coalitions when competing over a policy design. The shocks mentioned can rarely 
be induced by the coalitions. To influence governmental decisions according to their beliefs, 
advocacy coalitions act instrumentally rational in using the avaible venues in the 
constitutional structure.
 
13 Policy-oriented learning is in this context influenced by institutions: 
Every institutional access point subjects the advocacy coalition to a “decisional bias”
 14
ACF assumes that any political process takes places against a background of relatively 
stable parameters which define the constraints and resources of the actors. The parameters are 
“basic attributes of the problem…, fundamental sociocultural values and social structure…, 
[and the] basic constitutional structure.”
 due to 
differing internal dynamics.  
15  Also, Sabatier has added “long-term coalition 
opportunity structures” into his framework to account for the less pluralist European polity.
16
After relatively stable parameters, ACF turns to the dynamic features of a policy 
subsystem. External system events are identified as “changes in public opinion…changes 
in socioeconomic conditions…changes in the governing coalition [and] policy decisions from 
 
Essentially, long-term coalition opportunity structures are an extension of the basic 
constitutional structure and can therefore be treated as yet another stable parameter. They 
define the potential for finding coalition members and access points in the constitutional 
structure. 
                                                 
12   Sabatier, ACF Innovations, op.cit.: 208 
13   Sabatier, Paul and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1999): The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment’, in: 
Theories of the Policy Process edited by P. Sabatier (Colorado, Westview Press): 142-3 
14   Schlager, Edella (2007): A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, and Models of Policy Processes, in: in: 
Theories of the Policy Process edited by P. Sabatier (Colorado, Westview Press): 307 
15   Sabatier, ACF Innovations, op.cit. : 193 
16   ibid.: 199   7 
other subsystems.”
17 The inclusion of coalition resources is yet another modification of the 
1999 ACF version. These variables are dynamic, as they can change over relatively short 
periods (such as over a decade). Consequently, ACF assumes that a change in these variables 
is a “necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes of a 
governmental programme.”
18  These changes can redistribute resources and change belief 
systems in such a way that the power of the advocacy coalitions in a system is changed.
19
1.2 The Climate Change Policy Subsystem and the Corresponding Advocacy Coalitions 
 
The policy subsystem is the frame of action for all advocacy coalitions. If actors in a 
policy subsystem engage in nontrivially coordinated network alliances and share causal and 
normative beliefs, they can be called advocacy coalitions.
20
Deep core beliefs relate to normative judgements on, amongst other things, “the 
relative priority of fundamental values [and the relative priority of the welfare of different 
groups.”
 
  Advocacy coalitions aim at 
influencing the decisions of the policy subsystem. For this study, the working assumption 
relies on the existence on two advocacy coalitions that are united by their similarities on the 
dimensions of deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs.  
21 The two opposing belief systems can be called “economy-first” and “environment-
first,” depending on their stance towards the relative priority of economic growth and 
environmental protection. ENGOs belong, by definition, to the “environment-first” 
coalition.
22
                                                 
17   ibid.: 202 
18   ibid. 
19   ibid.: 204 
20   Sabatier, ACF Assessment, op.cit.: 120 
21   Sabatier, ACF Innovations, op.cit.: 194 
22   G8 (2001): “Introducing European Environmental NGOs. Their Role and Importance in European Union 
Decision-Making” (Brussels: http://www.eeb.org/publication/2001/BrochureGreen8-Light.pdf, retrieved 
22.04.2008) 
 As the most influential ENGOs, Climate Action Network (CAN, formerly Climate 
Network Europe, CNE) and the Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development (FIELD) were selected. Following the institutionalist logic, DG Environment   8 
belongs to the “environment-first” coalition as well. Its purpose in the Commission is the 
representation of environmental concerns. The European Parliament (EP) also belongs to this 
coalition, as it seems to be structurally favourable to environmental concerns.
23 Countries like 
Germany, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian member states and, partly, the UK are portrayed 
as environmental leaders
24
In contrast, business associations, whose belief system prioritizes economic growth 
and competitiveness,
 and assumingly place the environment high on their priority list. 
25 are vocal supporters of the “economy-first” coalition. DG Enterprise 
serves as a mirror to DG Environment in representing the interests of the business world in 
the Commission. The southern member states and large industrial states like France are 
consistently named as laggards in environmental legislation.
26
The application of deep core beliefs to policies reveals a less clear-cut distribution of 
the actors on a belief systems scale. Yet, policy core beliefs determine the final composition 
of advocacy coalitions.
 
27
Apart from the moderate FIELD,
 The policy core beliefs on the ETS can be organised on a scale from 
“flexible instrument” to “binding instrument.” A binding ETS would include a mandatory 
scheme for a large scope of sectors with absolute targets and no flexibility provisions.  
28 the ENGOs, again, are to be found at one extreme 
of the scale (binding),
29  whereas the business associations occupy the other extreme 
(flexible).
30
                                                 
23  Burns, Charlotte (2005): “The European Parliament: The European Union’s Environmental Champion?,” in: 
Environmental Policy in the European Union edited by A. Jordan (London: Earthscan) 
24   Börzel, Tanja (2005): “Pace-Setting, Foot-dragging and Fence-sitting: Member State Responses to 
Europeanization,” in: Environmental Policy in the European Union edited by A. Jordan (London: Earthscan) 
25   Pocklington, David (2002): “European Emissions Trading -  the Business Perspective,” European 
Environmental Law Review: 209–218 
26   Börzel, op.cit. 
27   Sabatier, ACF Innovations, op.cit. : 195 
28   FIELD: “Final Report to the Commission DG Environment: Study on the Legal/Policy Framework Needed 
for the Establishment of a Community Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Regime” (London: Ref.: 
ENV.A.2/ETU/2000/0050r, 23 November 2001) 
29   Bradley, Rob: Brief Critique of the Commissions Emission Trading Paper COM (2001) 581 (Brussels: 
CAN, December 2001) 
30   Pocklington, op.cit. 
 DG Environment has laid out from the very start a rather tough vision of the ETS   9 
instrument,
31  whereas  DG Enterprise lined up with the industry in calling for more 
flexibility.
32  The EP adopted resolutions which were even more far-reaching than the 
Commission proposal and are thus closest to the stance of the ENGOs.
33
Council members were divided in their domestic policy application of their beliefs.
  
34 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK developed emission trading schemes to benefit from a 
first-mover advantage. They generally supported the ETS but faced adaptation pressures. 
Germany applied its deep core beliefs by establishing voluntary agreements and was facing a 
misfit with the new, more binding instrument.
35 Germany, although potentially belonging to 
the environmentally friendly coalition, is to be placed in the “economy-first” group because it 
followed its industry’s stance and opposed the more environmentally friendly solutions in this 
particular case. Southern countries like Spain had no or little climate change politics in place 
and were in a constant learning process, heavily influenced by their “economy-first” belief. 
France was in the same position but more favourable to ETS because of its industrial 
structure.
36
                                                 
31   European Commission (2001): Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and 
Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC,” COM(2001) 581 final (Brussels: OJ C75 E/33) 
32   Interview with Dr. Joachim Ehrenberg, European Commission, Brussels 18.04.2008 
33   European Parliament (2002): “***I Report on the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive 
Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and 
Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (COM(2001) 581” (Brussels: A5-0303/2002, 13 September 2002) 
34   Woerdman, Edwin (2004): “Path-dependent Climate Policy: The History and Future of Emissions Trading 
in Europe,” European Environment 14 (5): 261-275 
35   Interview with Dr. Joachim Ehrenberg, European Commission, Brussels 18.04.2008 
36   ibid. 
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environment-first 
CAN 
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instrument 
binding 
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economy-first 
DG ENV 
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DG ENTR 
EP 
Germany 
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Denmark 
UK 
EURELECTRIC 
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If the (representative) actors are placed in a coordinate plane, a pattern occurs which 
enables the identification of two advocacy coalitions. In such a coordinate plane, the 
“environment-first” advocacy coalition consists out of the ENGOs, DG Environment, the EP 
and countries like the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries (here: Denmark), and possibly the 
UK. The “economy-first” advocacy coalition consists of the business interest groups, DG 
Enterprise, Germany, Southern countries like Spain, and to a certain extent France and the 
UK. It is obvious that both advocacy coalitions are represented in the entire decision-making 
process.  
   11 
2. The Impact of External Factors on ENGOs’ Effectiveness 
2.1 Relatively Stable Parameters 
Firstly, one of the relatively stable parameters which define the constraints for the 
advocacy coalitions are the basic attributes of the problem. The risks of CO2 and other climate 
gases can only be assessed based on scientific interpretations. This manifests prime conditions 
for policy-learning as foreseen in ACF. The natural consequence of a “scientific mediation” 
of risk leads to the “scientization” of environmental policy-making.
37 In the management of 
risk, politics relies on science and science becomes politicized (e.g. IPCC).
38
Secondly, the relatively stable parameter of fundamental sociocultural values is 
represented in the general attitude of the public towards the trade-off between the 
environment and growth. Available Eurobarometer data
 The inescapable 
need for action is a constant, independent variable which continually reinforces the beliefs of 
the “environment-first” advocacy coalition, and potentially questions basic assumptions of the 
“economy-first” coalition. 
39
Thirdly, the basic constitutional structure of the EU influences the lobbying efforts of 
outsiders to the decision-making process. The EU lacks “a single dominating centre of 
  displayed a clear belief system 
regarding the preferences of the European public in the trade-off between environmental 
protection and economic growth: Europeans consistently opted by a huge majority for finding 
a balance between economic growth and environmental protection whenever possible. 
Bearing this long-term preference for a balanced solution in mind, the European Union 
negotiated in Kyoto and designed the ETS. 
                                                 
37   Eden, Sally (1996): “Public Participation in Environmental Policy: Considering Scientific, Counter-
Scientific and Non-Scientific Contributions,” Public Understanding of Science 5: 189 
38   Reiner, Grundmann (2007): “Climate Change and Knowledge Politics,” Environmental Politics, 16 (3): 427 
39   European Commission (1999): Eurobarometer “What Do Europeans Think About the Environment? The 
Main Results of the Survey Carried Out in the Context of Eurobarometer 51.1,” (Brussels); European 
Commission (1995): Eurobarometer 43.1bis “Europeans and the Environment” (Brussels); European 
Commission (1992): Eurobarometer “Europeans and the Environment in 1992” (Brussels); European 
Commission (1988): Eurobarometer “Les Européens et l’Environnement en 1988” (Brussels); European 
Commission (1986): Eurobarometer “Die Europäer und ihre Umwelt” (Brussels)   12 
authority and power”
40  and is possibly best understood with the multi-level governance 
approach
41  that is conjoined with different logics of decision-making. The first stages of 
decision-making of the ETS Directive within the Commission allowed it to act as a policy 
entrepreneur.
42
We can also distinguish between a ‘policy stream’ and a ‘political stream’.
 
 Technocratic officials shape the first proposal for legislation. This process is 
profoundly different from interinstitutional bargaining, bargaining between Commissioners, 
and negotiations in the ‘institutional triangle’.  
43 In the 
former, persuasion and the diffusion of ideas play a major role, whereas in the latter, 
consensus is achieved by bargaining. The deliberative process in the policy stream matches 
the importance of argumentative rationality in the ACF.
44  In the political stream of 
interinstitutional relations, however, coalitions are not built by persuasion but by granting 
“concessions in return for support of the coalition.”
45 As conflictual bargaining occurs only 
rarely due to the consensus-culture
46 and the permanence of negotiations in the EU,
47
Fourthly, the opportunity structures impact the potential success of ENGOs. The 
degree of consensus which is needed for major policy change and the openness of the political 
 there 
seems to be place for both ACF assumptions of policy learning and hurting stalemate. NGOs 
face a differentiated process of decision-making with different ratios of consensus and 
bargaining culture. Promoting their case from the outside requires vast resources and broad 
access. Especially NGOs bear in mind that the Commission drafts the first proposal and thus 
sets a potentially path-dependent process in motion.  
                                                 
40   Olsen, Johan (1997): “European Challenges to the Nation State,” in: Political Institutions and Public Policy 
edited by B. Steunenberg and Frans van Vught (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers): 165 
41   Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank (1996): “European Integration from the 1980s: State-
Centric v. Multi-level Governance,” Journal of Common Market Studies 34: 341-378 
42   Telephone interview with Dr. Henning Arp, European Commission, 08.04.2008 
43   Kingdon (2003), op.cit.: 159 
44   Habermas, Jürgen (1985): “The Theory of Communicative Action” (Boston: Beacon Press) 
45   Kingdon (2003), op.cit.: 159 
46   Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona and Helen Wallace (1997): “The Council of Ministers” (Houndmills: Macmillan 
Press) 
47   Héritier, Adrienne (1996): “The Accommodation of Diversity in European Policymaking and Its Outcomes: 
Regulatory Policy As a Patchwork,” Journal of European Public Policy 3 (2): 157   13 
system are defined by Sabatier as decisive for opportunity structures. The degree of consensus 
needed was determined by the Amsterdam Treaty at the time of the debate on the directive. 
Rejecting a Council position or accepting the legislation in the Second Reading required an 
absolute majority in the EP, and the Council required 71 per cent of the votes to legislate. 
This constitutes a high level of consensus which is needed to legislate – but an even higher 
barrier to achieve changes in the text initially proposed by the Commission. The Commission 
itself is involved in a highly fragmented policy-making framework with different DGs 
following their own institutional interests and a hierarchical decision-making process. In this 
case, DG Environment was the lead DG. The Commission’s legal service and the DGs for 
taxation, energy, internal market and enterprise were involved in the drafting.
48
Regarding the openness of the system, the multi-level governance system leads to a 
situation where no actor has sufficient political resources and knowledge to act without 
external support. Particularly the Commission notoriously lacks staff and expert resources
 The degree of 
consensus needed within and between the respective institutions rather diminishes the chances 
for effective lobbying of interests, which are not likely to win huge margins of support if not 
done so resourcefully. 
49 
and additionally faces a discussion about its legitimacy. The Commission as an institution 
thus has to be open to outsider input. Additionally, Mazey argues that DG Environment shares 
environmentally friendly beliefs to such an extent that ENGOs have captured the agency
  50 - 
and “often, it is even enough to access five officials to influence the text substantially.”
 51
                                                 
48   Telephone interview with Dr. Henning Arp, European Commission, 08.04.2008 
49   Donnelly, Martin (1993): “The Structure of the European Commission and the Policy Formation Process,” 
in: Lobbying in the European Community edited by S. Mazey and J. Richardson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) 
50   Mazey, Sonia and Jeremy Richardson (2005): “Environmental Groups and the European Community: 
Challenges and Opportunities,” in: Environmental Policy in the European Union edited by J. Andrew 
(London: Earthscan): 115 
51   Interview with Sanjeev Kumar, WWF, Brussels 28.03.2008 
 The   14 
EP is traditionally seen as “the ‘greenest’ of the three main policy-making bodies.”
52  Its 
Committee for Environment belongs to the most influential committees in the Parliament and 
is very receptive to ENGOs.
  53 It should, however, be emphasised that “open doors do not 
equal persuasion.”
54 With regard to the Council, openness is much more limited. Firstly, the 
Council acts in a far less transparent way than any other European institution. Delegates have, 
as a rule, rather clear orders from the capitals. ENGOs therefore try to ensure that “our 
national members are heavily involved on the national level,”
55 meaning that openness is 
highly dependent on the domestic systems. Such a complex system is difficult to target with 
limited resources and requires a lot of co-ordination. Overall, the Council remains “a sort of a 
black box” for ENGOs.
56
2.2 External (System) Events 
 Concluding, there is a potential influence for ENGOs to realise, but 
the longer the decision-making process endures, the more difficult it becomes to have an 
impact for policy outsiders. Additionally, the system is so complex that many resources are 
necessary to induce policy-oriented learning or persuasion on a large scale. 
The underlying argument of the ACF on external events is that they influence political 
resources of support and access, or even the possible change of policy core beliefs.
 57 Looking 
firstly at the socioeconomic conditions, the overall gross domestic product (GDP) in the EU 
steadily grew from 1997 to 2000 from between more than 2.5 to nearly 4 per cent, whereas 
growth slowed down significantly after 2000.
 58
                                                 
52   Lenschow, Andrea (2005): “Environmental Policy. Contending Dynamics of Policy Change,” in: Policy 
Making in the European Union edited by H. Wallace; W. Wallace and M. Pollack (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press): 315 
53   ibid.: 67-86 
54   Interview with a Representative of an ENGO, Bruges 09.04.2008 
55   Interview with Tomas Wyns, CAN, Brussels 18.04.2008 
56   ibid. 
57   Sabatier, ACF Innovations, op.cit. : 199 
58  IMF (2007): World Economic Outlook Database (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/ 
weodata/index.aspx, retrieved 19.04.2008) 
 Governments naturally were concerned about 
economic development during this stage. Economic growth was one of the dominating 
discourses of this time. Reports produced in this context are dominated by concerned   15 
assessments.
59
Secondly, concern about climate change is proven to be consistently prominent over 
more than two decades, and citizens became ever more worried about climate change. Climate 
change ranked amongst the four most worrying environmental threats for more than a decade. 
After 1997, media attention towards climate change increased significantly.
 Such socioeconomic conditions did not establish a positive climate for actors 
arguing that the environment should have priority over the economy. 
60 The shift of 
public opinion has clearly focused the attention of the public and of decision-makers on 
climate change. Such a statement fits neatly to the ACF prediction that the “most important 
effect of external shock is the redistribution of resources or opening and closing venues within 
a policy subsystem
”61
Thirdly, Sabatier points to the importance of changes in systemic governing coalitions. 
The government coalitions ruling in the years 1999-2003 constituted important political 
resources for the actors. It is assumed that governments tending to the left are more receptive 
to environmental concerns and more sceptical about the market. During the ETS discussions, 
European political affiliations were reflected in a structural left majority in the European 
Council (eleven vs. four).
 The Blairite Third Way project, however, was well aware of the 
globalisation challenges.
  There was also a socialist dominance in the College of 
Commissioners in the period of 1999 to 2004: Out of twenty Commissioners, eleven belonged 
to the PES-family and the important portfolios for the advocacy coalitions were mostly 
socialist. In that respect, the Prodi Commission was likely to be a relatively receptive access 
point for ENGOs or the “environment-first” coalition. 
  
                                                 
59   European Commission (2003): “European Competitiveness Report 2003 (Staff Working Document),” 
SEC(2003)1299 (Brussels, 12.11.2003): 6 
60   Carpenter, Chad (2001): “Businesses, Green Groups and the Media: The Role of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the Climate Change Debate,” International Affairs 77 (2): 319 
61   Sabatier, ACF Innovations, op.cit.: 199 
The EP, on the other hand, was 
dominated since 1999 by the conservatives (today EPP-ED). As the EP tends to be the most 
environmentally friendly of the European institutions, the power structure of the subsystem   16 
climate change policy was, if not overtly environmentalist, certainly not structurally hostile to 
environment friendly policy solutions. 
Fourthly, the most significant perturbation for the ETS originated in outputs from the 
international political climate change subsystem. The main EU opponent during the Kyoto 
negotiations, the US, had rather positive experience with permit trading
  62 and made flexible 
market-based instruments their sine qua non in the negotiations. Eventually, the EU had to 
accept the emission trading system in a package deal.
63 For the EU, the Kyoto Mechanisms 
represented a different regulatory tradition and philosophy.
64  The mechanisms, however, 
resounded well with the well-known limits of a command-and-control approach and the 
necessary economization of environmental policy. A second international dynamic push 
factor for the EU to create an ETS was the emergence of the ETS as an instrument of 
symbolic politics in light of the hesitancies of the US, Canada, Japan and Russia.
65
3. The Climate Change Policy Subsystem and the Emission Trading Directive 
 These 
dynamics formed the major impetus for the policy change in the EU.  
 
Any advocacy coalition’s action potential is facilitated or hampered by short-term 
constraints and available resources. Among these resources are organisational resources, such 
as 1.) staffing and financial endowment, and 2.) expertise (incl. competitive arguments) at 
hand. Furthermore, there are political resources, such as 3.) access to (or representation in) the 
Commission, the EP and the Council, 4.) public and institutional trust, 5.) representativeness, 
and 6.) the degree of co-ordination and unity in the coalition. 
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The organisational resources of ENGOs in the form of staffing and finances (1) have 
been stable and grew steadily over the last years.
66 The Commission also has been active in 
securing their representation in Brussels financially (with the exception of Greenpeace).
67
The expertise at hand (2) is well-developed. ENGOs have been able to provide the 
Commission and the EP with the information they needed.
  
68  FIELD, for instance, was 
commissioned for legal studies by the Commission. In relation to the Council, however, 
ENGOs are weakly placed. Firstly, the relationship between ENGOs and national 
governments tends to be conflictual.
69
The access to the institutional triangle (3) has been covered in general terms already. 
In concrete terms, members of the “environment-first” coalition with formal authority have 
been DG Environment and the EP. When tackling the issue of trust (4), ENGOs scored 
persistently high in Eurobarometer surveys on public trust. This clearly is a political resource 
for ENGOs. In the institutions, however, individual track records count the most: “It comes 
down to individuals. Personal relationships matter.”
 Secondly, environmental interests are of less interest 
to nation states as they are not as local as business interests but rather a cross-border interest. 
70
The public opinion criterion (5) of Sabatier has been covered already as part of the 
external system events: With growing concern and media interest in the climate change issue, 
ENGOs were endowed with a supportive element in their strategy. The representativeness of 
ENGOs is well-developed: The G8 (or CAN in this respect) in general served as a “one stop 
 Thus it is more difficult to judge upon 
the general trust within the institutions towards ENGOs. 
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shop”
71 for the Commission. In 2001, the G8 organisations had 20 million members, which 
equalled more than 5 per cent of all Europeans.
72
With regards to co-ordination and internal cohesion (6), the ENGOs fared well in the 
ETS case. Following ACF, fundamental ideas, core beliefs and principles generally converge 
among ENGOs.
  
73 ENGOs work on the basis of the “highest common factor,” contrary to 
business interests that act on a “lowest common denominator.”
74 The flexible nature and 
different lobbying styles within the coordinated network allowed for a common yet 
differentiated approach.
75
3.1 The Advocacy Coalitions: Standpoints and Strategies 
To outline the policy core beliefs of the ENGOs in more depth, the position of CAN is 
taken as an example. It is also necessary to explain the position of representatives of the 
“economy-first” coalition (business interests) to explain the basic policy core choices 
available. The other actors had positions placed somewhere in between these two groups. 
 
CAN had a generally sceptical but “cautiously positive”
  76 view on the new policy 
instrument of emissions trading. The ETS, with the controllable caps and identifiable results, 
represented a second-best choice after energy taxation. CAN advocated a strong instrument, 
including a mandatory scheme and absolute targets.
77  CAN warned against allowing for 
interaction with the Kyoto trading regimes.
78  An allocation system for the permits of 
grandfathering based on historical emissions instead of auctioning was “totally 
unacceptable”.
79 CAN argued in favour of strong monitoring rules and penalties.
80
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The business interest groups took a stand completely contrary to the ENGOs.
81 
Competitiveness and market distortions were the main concerns of the industry.
82 Generally, 
the industry argued that negotiated or voluntary agreements are effective as well, and they 
doubted the necessity of a mandatory ETS.
83 According to them, the scope of the directive 
with regards to sectors and gases should be as wide as possible and the caps be set with 
relative targets.
84 The energy intensive industry demanded grandfathering as an allocation 
mechanism,
85 whereas UNICE proposed to have at least a negotiated agreement of industry 
and governments on the permits.
86 On penalties, there was a consensus on their necessity but 
not on their form.
87
Facing the policy stream, the ENGOs focused on providing expertise in order to 
induce policy-learning in the entire policy-formulation circle in the Commission, consisting of 
the consultation procedure, the stakeholder working group, and the interservice consultations. 
By doing so, they were well aware that “the higher a proposal goes within the Commission, 
the more reduced is the capacity for interest representation.”
 
88
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 Influencing the proposal as 
early as possible was thus crucial in order to establish some path-dependency. The “economy-
first” coalition was following a similar approach, but could rely more on its strength in the 
political stream. Facing the political stream, the ENGOs focused on providing relevant 
information to those actors accessible and influential. The Council remained an 
“unpredictable venue  for civil society interests focused upon the detail of a legislative   20 
proposal.”
89
3.2 The Decision-Making Process: The Policy Stream 
 The natural strategy of the ENGOs was thus to build a counterbalancing EP 
coalition to the Council and trusting in the strong influence exerted earlier. The “economy-
first” coalition focused, as outlined earlier, more on the Council, to which they can best 
provide nationally relevant information. 
When the Commission proposed the second climate change policy instruments 
package that included the ETS, it was frustrated. Its earlier proposals for energy taxation 
directives had failed in the Council due to a hurting stalemate (in the classical ACF fashion).
90 
In 1997, the Kyoto-Protocol put emission trading on the political agenda of the EU. This 
external perturbation clearly is a focusing event (in ACF terms
91
Also, by 1998, delivering the promised emission reductions had become a question of 
political credibility.
) which predefined the 
direction of action. Summarizing the period before 1998, it can be said that external system 
events like the increasing importance of climate change shifted critical resources.  
92 In 1998 and 1999, a number of member states (Sweden, UK, Denmark, 
the Netherlands) belonging to the “environment-first” coalition attempted to benefit from a 
first-mover advantage.
 93 Surprisingly, some business actors like BP took action as well. This 
political momentum forced the Commission to move ahead to prevent less efficient domestic 
or small-scale trading schemes.
94
The Commission, however, faced a persisting lack of experience with international 
emissions trading. ENGOs were willing and able to provide expertise. London-based FIELD, 
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with an expertise in international public law, was well-placed to provide a study on designing 
options for the ETS.
95  The Commission published its Green Paper relying on this study. 
FIELD argued in favour of industry (not government) level trading, reasoning that this would 
ensure competitiveness.
96  It also laid down different possibilities for intervention 
mechanisms, employed arguments in favour of auctioning instead of grandfathering, and was 
in favour of strong penalties.
97  The Commission’s Green Paper argued very similarly, 
sometimes even with the same wording (e.g. for equity level trading, auctioning, interventions 
and penalties).
98 The Green Paper also followed FIELD in selecting the sectors to be covered 
by the directive.
99
ENGOs have thus been able to influence the Commission very early by providing 
convincing expertise. Interestingly, DG Environment commissioned a research institute 
whose close affiliations with the ENGOs was known. The ACF would identify shared deep 
core beliefs as the reason for such a ‘nontrivial’ cooperation. The official consultation process 
started only afterwards and amounted to 700 pages of comments.
 
100
DG Environment had already been involved both in interservice consultations and had 
commissioned FIELD for a second study in 2001 when it started its official stakeholder 
 The basic structure of the 
response has been outlined in the strategy subchapter already. A stakeholder working group in 
the context of the ECCP was established thereafter and served as a crucial forum for debates. 
WWF,  CAN and FIELD were members of this group, together with business interests, 
member states and different DGs. Over time, the ETS emerged as the accepted second-best 
option both for ENGOs and industry. This resonates well with the ACF assumption that 
institutions provide learning mechanisms. 
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consultation process. FIELD even proposed a directive to DG Environment. The final draft 
proposal by DG Environment is in parts literally copied from the study, though other parts 
underwent a complete overhaul. The main features of the study were accepted: The proposal 
suggested a cap-and-trade format on the basis of the IPPC Directive.
101 FIELD introduced 
provisions on access to information in order to allow the public to participate better.
102 The 
final directive differed from the FIELD proposal insofar as it was more open to other 
greenhouse gases to be included. It also did not leave the method of allocation completely to 
the member states.
103  Penalties were planned to be “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive”
 104
FIELD, in some aspects, did not act as an advocacy NGO when proposing 
compromises based on the result of its own consultations with main stakeholders. It did, 
however, secure a penalty regime and a careful expansion of the sectorial scope, while being 
cautious about the gas scope. Crucially, it also included transparency provisions which 
became important later on in the whistle-blowing activities of the ENGOs.
 according to FIELD, and the Commission specified what it would consider 
to meet these criteria concretely. 
105
The DGs represented different interests. DG Enterprise initially demanded co-
responsibility for the dossier but failed in securing this.
 Providing a 
study was a much more efficient strategy than exerting pressure later, as industry did. 
106 The influence of the “economy-
first” coalition was decisively weakened by this institutional decision. In March 2001, Bush 
announced the retreat of the US from the Kyoto Protocol and therewith increased the need to 
deliver political leadership.
107
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 This put DG Enterprise under additional pressure. Also, DG   23 
Competition feared the opt-outs and increased flexibility advocated by DG Enterprise.
108 
ENGOs have been active in pointing out this danger to DG Competition as they provided 
Commission officials with arguments before they met their counterparts in the interservice 
consultations.
109 Obviously, ENGOs did not secure the isolation of DG Enterprise, but their 
involvement can be safely assumed. Eventually, DG Enterprise did not achieve more than a 
third of its objectives,
110
The passion of the desk official of DG Environment  is striking and points to his 
underlying policy core beliefs: “We had a sense of mission, we all knew that we were 
working on something big”.
 presumably because of its relative isolation.  
111
It shall be expressly noted here that the policy stream of finding rational solutions in 
the Commission was diluted from the start by the shadow of the political stream. The decision 
for grandfathering instead of auctioning, for instance, was an anticipatory surrender to the 
political constellations.
  
112  No appeal to deliver leadership by ENGOs could achieve a 
different outcome. On the other hand, the “environment-first“ coalition had a strong political 
leader in the Environment Commissioner Wallström who achieved that the initially envisaged 
opt-out provisions were deleted two days before the draft directive was presented.
113
3.3 The Decision-Making Process: The Political Stream 
 
The decision-making process of the ETS-Directive is remarkable insofar that it was 
“an ultra-quick political “pregnancy.”
114
The EP discussed more than 500 proposals to change the proposal by the Commission 
and adopted more than 70 in its First Reading.
  From the first proposal to the adoption of the 
directive, only two years went by and changes did not decisively alter the initial proposal. 
115
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 ENGOs approached individual MEPs to   24 
table amendments for them and published a voting recommendation for the plenary session.
116
In lobbying the Council, major ENGOs emphasized in an open letter in October 
2002
 
The EP eventually called for 15 per cent auctioning of the permits instead of allocating them 
for free from 2005 onwards and upheld the mandatory system, but it did allow for a link to the 
Kyoto mechanisms. It also demanded a strict penalty system and a broader scope with regards 
to gases and sectors. Most of these amendments supported the general ENGO stance. In its 
argumentation, the EP followed the same line from the very start as the ENGOs. The 
“environment-first” coalition built by the Commission and ENGOs with the EP was stable. 
117 that a strong compliance system, a mandatory system from 2005 onwards, uniform 
EU-wide auctioning, and an exclusion of Kyoto project mechanisms were necessary. The 
Common Position, however, did not follow the ENGOs’ stance. The Council did offer a 
compromise of ten per cent auctioning of the permits from 2008 onwards to the EP and a 40€ 
penalty per emitted ton of CO2
Unlike in 1999, Germany found itself in an advocacy coalition of hesitant states with 
significantly different industrial backgrounds, different emission targets, and expertise gaps in 
most of the countries. Such a coalition was naturally not very strong. France, which holds 
“economy-first” deep core beliefs, has comparably low emissions due to its nuclear energy 
 up to 2008 and 100€/ton thereafter to the EP. Concerning the 
penalties, this also became the final compromise. The Council watered the proposal down and 
also included the possibility to form trading pools in the member states, as well as industry-
specific opt-out possibilities for member states between 2005-2008. The general reasons for 
the failure of environmental lobbying have been explained already earlier: ENGOs are 
complete outsiders to internal Council dynamics.  
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and consequently was a special case.
118 ETS was thus in its interest. Additionally, the German 
government was not able to block the ETS because of various external factors like 
international pressure. What is more, the Greens achieved a general commitment in the 
coalition agreement to accept a European emission trading scheme in 1998.
119 The UK was 
won over by the Commission’s arguments to not oppose a mandatory system on the 
Community level.
120  Offering the UK a temporary exemption
121
The final negotiations of the Council with the EP in a highly political stream did not 
leave much room for ENGO influence either. In the Second Reading, the EP re-scheduled 25 
amendments, pressing for domestic caps for the permits, the possibility to include other 
sectors from 2008 onwards and a limitation to the opt-outs.
  was crucial for the 
“environment-first” coalition to divide a potential blocking coalition. The UK thus joined the 
Scandinavian countries, Austria and the Netherlands in promoting the ETS as proposed by the 
Commission. 
ENGOs did not have any stake in these negotiations. Germany had been isolated to 
some extent, it was in a coalition with weak voting powers and weak competitive arguments. 
It needed to establish a hurting stalemate in ACF terms to achieve its aims because both 
external perturbations and policy-oriented learning constituted impediments to its success. 
Eventually, Germany’s strategy of establishing a hurting stalemate and a bargaining situation 
prevailed over argumentative reasoning. The ACF with its strong belief in norm-driven actors 
and dynamics seems to find its limits at this point. 
122 The final agreement struck 
between the Council and the EP in June 2003 established, in essence, a mandatory system, 
starting with the limited IPPC sectors and CO2
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  only. The allocation mechanism was 
decentralised, as envisaged, but a mix of auctioning and grandfathering.   26 
The strategy of ENGOs to aim for a strong first proposal and to counterbalance the 
Council with the EP was rather successful. They managed to achieve a mandatory system 
with absolute targets, strong penalties and a limited amount of allocation by auctioning. They 
were not able to prevent opt-outs and flexibility measures, nor the decentralised allocation of 
permits.  
 
4. Conclusion: General Findings 
This paper was led by the question of the influence of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) 
in a multi-level governance system under co-decision, given a multitude of actors and access 
points.  Following the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) approach, policy change is 
attributed to four different variables: external perturbations, internal shocks, policy-oriented 
learning and a hurting stalemate. Policy change can only  occur if the four variables act 
together or individually to distribute political resources anew or change the composition of 
the advocacy coalitions. In the policy subsystem climate change, this paper has identified an 
“environment-first” advocacy coalition and a coalition advocating “economy-first” beliefs. 
For the purpose of this paper, ACF has been complemented with the policy stream-political 
stream dichotomy of Kingdon. 
Relatively stable parameters and external system events are factors which determine 
the influence of advocacy coalitions. The most important external factor was the international 
commitment of the EU to deliver emission reductions. The basic constitutional structure of 
the EU as a multi-level governance system requires ENGOs to invest huge resources to obtain 
favourable political results. As outsiders to the bodies with formal authority, they need 
powerful coalition members. It has emerged that the basic attributes of climate change allow 
ENGOs to frame policy debates if they are able to turn science into politics. Fundamental 
sociocultural values preferring a compromise between growth and environmental protection 
as well as a public concerned about climate change ensured that ENGOs were listened to in   27 
the policy process, whereas the difficult economic situation of the Community limited its 
impact. The short-term constraints and resources of ENGOs are to be assessed as moderately 
positive, as they enable them to lobby in a meaningful way. 
It seems that ENGOs were able to achieve a lot of their objectives in the policy stream 
due to two factors. Firstly, the advocacy coalitions within the institutions were favourable to 
ENGO influence. Secondly, ENGOs were well-placed to contribute to policy-oriented 
learning in the policy stream. They provided studies which heavily influenced the initial 
design of the ETS-Directive. Additionally, ENGOs counterbalanced the input of business 
interests well. A strategy based on arguments was thus the most successful in the policy 
stream. 
In the political stream, the ENGOs had limited access to the Council but rather good 
access to the EP, and they had to counterbalance the former with the latter. In the political 
stream, the influence of outsiders in the bargaining process diminishes and arguments are less 
important than power. It seems that, in general, ENGOs can contribute to policy-oriented 
learning and instrumentalise internal or external perturbations. They are not able to create a 
negotiation stalemate, though. 
It should be emphasised that the findings of this study cannot be easily generalised. 
The process of adopting the ETS Directive was unusually quick and strongly influenced by 
the international policy subsystem. Additionally, ETS was a new policy instrument the EU 
institutions were not accustomed to. Under these circumstances, it seems that ENGOs can 
influence EU decision-making if they are part of a strong advocacy coalition which is well 
integrated into the entire decision-making process. Due to the path-dependency of decisions 
in the policy stream, it can be sufficient to achieve a strong first proposal by the Commission 
and find an ally in the EP to counterbalance attempts of the Council to water the proposal 
down.    28 
Some remarks on the usefulness of the applied theoretical approach shall be made. A 
counterfactual thought exercise provides a different perspective on the study’s findings. If 
there had been no ENGOs in the entire process, the “environment-first“ coalition of DG 
Environment, the EP and some member states would still have been rather strong considering 
the circumstances. The ACF assumes that deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs are 
difficult to change. It is likely that DG Environment and the EP would have made many of its 
proposals in a similar fashion. ENGOs seem not to have tipped the balance; they did not play 
a crucial role as outsiders to the system. They have, however, counterbalanced the arguments 
and lobbying efforts of business interests. They have also made valid arguments which shaped 
the design of the directive and pointed out potential flaws. Further theoretical research is 
needed to develop the ACF to account for the influence of different actors in the same 
advocacy coalition. One starting point could be the integratedness of the actor in the 
constitutional system. 
The application of Kingdon’s metaphor has showed that policy and political stream 
dynamics are distinct enough to change the influence of some variables in the ACF. For 
example, the openness of the political system is more important in the policy than in the 
political stream. The resources and strategies needed in the different streams also differ 
according to the stream the advocacy coalitions swim in. The analysis in the political stream 
on the grounds of ACF variables like policy-oriented learning did encounter difficulties. The 
ACF is theoretically weak in accounting for rational cost-benefit calculations, behaviour and 
bargaining. This study seems to suggest that advocacy coalitions have different functions in 
the different streams. They provide for intellectual exchange and learning processes in the 
policy stream, and serve as bargaining coalitions in the political stream. 
It remains to be seen whether the developments since 2005 were as beneficial for 
ENGOs. The window of opportunity which existed due to a lack of legislative experience is 
closed after the ETS pilot phase of 2005-2008.    29 
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